

TACTICS ON BERLIN AT THE SUMMIT

1. In the light of our estimate of Soviet intentions (Section 1, above), the tactical aspect of the Summit conference relating to Berlin assumes overriding importance. In view of the compressed nature which discussions at the Summit will inevitably assume, the Western tactic should preferably be uncomplicated and direct so that it can be executed successfully in full. It should, moreover, as far as possible be flexible enough to cope with Soviet tactics both anticipated and unanticipated. We see a range of tactical possibilities theoretically available to the West:

2. The Western Powers could go to the Summit with a fixed position on Berlin which they are reasonably certain in advance will not be negotiable but beyond which they would not be prepared to go even pre-emptively to obtain agreement to discuss the subject further. They would, therefore, have to be prepared for a complete breakdown of discussions, and the Western tactical objective at the Summit would thus essentially become one of attempting to have such a breakdown of negotiations occur under circumstances leaving the West in the best possible public posture.

3. A second possible tactical approach is to aim directly during the Summit meeting at the achievement of a substantive agreement on Berlin of an interim nature acceptable to the West. In view of the time factor, this would presumably necessitate a quick initiation of substantive discussions, perhaps at a point somewhat short of the July 28 proposals with the idea of rapidly moving towards an agreement of which they might provide the core.

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4. In the light of our estimate of Soviet intentions, however, neither of the foregoing is consistent with Western interests. A more realistic objective of the Western Powers at the Summit will be to gain time by providing sufficient inducement, as well as deterrent, so that the Soviets will not take action which fundamentally affects the Western position in Berlin. The West will accordingly wish to have a flexible approach in order to take advantage of any tactical possibilities which might develop. To achieve such an objective would presumably require at a minimum that a forum be provided after the Summit meeting for continuing discussion of the Berlin question. Western tactics should be designed to test what would additionally be required within the limits of the maximum acceptable so to achieve the desired results without conceding any anything unnecessarily.

5. The tactical approach of the West might accordingly proceed as follows:

a. On the assumption that the Soviets start out by insisting on the necessity of a peace treaty with the two Germans, the Western Powers would reneath their Western Peace Plan. When the Soviets reject this, as may be anticipated, the Western Powers would advance their proposal for a plebiscite to be held in West and East Germany and in all Berlin. (See Section ~~3~~ above.)

b. When the discussion turns to Berlin proper, the Soviets will presumably reiterate the desirability of their free city proposal. The Western Powers would normally wish to start by restating their standard position

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position that the only lasting and real solution to the Berlin problem must come within the framework of German reunification.

c. The next question would be whether there were any tactical advantages to be gained by the West in putting forward an all-Berlin proposal, even if such a proposal is considered non-negotiable?

Question: Should this possibility be explored further?

d. The Western Powers would thereafter be confronted with the choice either of attempting immediately to find some basis upon which Soviet acceptance of the idea of continuing negotiation of the Berlin problem could be obtained, or of attempting further to probe by making certain limited proposals dealing, for example, with the access question alone. Thus, the West might put forward the German proposal for a formal agreement embodying access improvements, or propose the establishment of a special Four-Power authority with German advisers to regulate and maintain access to Berlin. Whether such proposals would actually serve any purpose, tactical or otherwise, could only be judged in the light of the actual situation at the time. Question: Should specific proposals along these lines be prepared by the Working Group?

e. It might be possible to secure an agreement -- perhaps no more than a tacit one -- to preserve the existing situation for a period of time during which an attempt might be made to achieve progress towards a more formal agreement. One way of doing this might be to seek agreement at the Summit on certain general principles relating to Berlin which might be embodied in a directive and remand the task of further negotiation to a subordinate group (perhaps Deputy Foreign Ministers), which would report

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tension during this period of prolonged  
procedural declarations which might possibly  
maintain unhindered communication to  
prosecutors. *1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 8*

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with a view to referral of the details to a committee of experts for further negotiation. This would presumably give the Soviets plausible grounds for agreeing to this course, if they were willing to postpone a showdown on Berlin.

6. If the Soviets refuse this, we could then inform them that the negotiations on Berlin appeared to be getting nowhere and that we feel the whole question should be referred to a committee of experts who would report to a subsequent Summit meeting. (The committee of experts might well be at the Deputy Foreign Ministers' level, if added stature for the negotiating body would assist in reaching agreement.)

7. One tactical question which will arise is whether, and if so at what point, the West should express willingness to discuss the principles of a peace treaty with Germany either in a Deputies or expert group. It seems possible to make this concession in method without any prejudice to the basic Western position, if there is a tactical advantage to be gained. An important consideration would be whether it appears at some point during the Summit conference that a Western offer to discuss peace treaty principles might tip the balance in favor of achieving the Western objective of continuing conversations with the Soviets.

8. The Working Group assumes, of course, that the general mood of the Summit will to some extent be influenced by the amount of agreement already reached or in prospect in the disarmament field. If the situation in this field is favorable, it would give the Western Powers a certain leverage to use in persuading the Soviets not to press too hard on the

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Berlin issue. However, the precise tactical interrelationship of the various subjects at the Summit can only be determined later in the light of the actual situation.

9. Should it become evident that the Soviets will refuse to agree to further discussion of the Berlin question except on the basis of non-acceptable our concessions by the West, the Western Powers might consider setting into motion a Berlin plebiscite in the Western sectors of the city in order to provide the best starting point for ensuing developments.

10. If it seems that an impasse has been reached and the best judgment is that a real danger exists the Soviets will proceed to take unilateral action preparatory to ending their responsibilities in the access field, the Western Powers might conclude that the time had come to put the Soviets on notice and perhaps also to initiate UN action as contemplated in their contingency plans.

11. The possibility exists (as suggested by Ambassador Smirnov in Bonn) that the Soviets will at an early stage attempt to resume the discussion of an interim solution for Berlin at the point where the Geneva discussion broke off, stating that, while the Western proposals of July 28 were not entirely satisfactory, they are willing to consider whether certain further changes could not be made which might make possible an agreement. Should this take place, the Western Powers will have to take care that they are not maneuvered into the embarrassing position of refusing to talk about their own proposals. One possibility aimed at avoiding immediate negotiation on this basis would be for the Western

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Powers to emphasize that the only real and lasting solution to the Berlin problem is within the framework of German reunification which the Western Peace Plan was intended to achieve in a reasonable and fair way. The Western Powers could then move back to their July 28 proposals via the course suggested in paragraph 5.d., above, plus any other tactical proposals aimed at improving various aspects of the Western position in Berlin.

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